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Trump¶VWULXPSK: the failure of &OLQWRQ¶Vprogressive politics and the 




Trump¶Velection represents primarily the failure of &OLQWRQ¶Vbrand of progressive politics. 
Her courting of Wall St, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood celebrities alienated the forgotten 
PHQ DQG ZRPHQ WKH RQH PHPRUDEOH SKUDVH LQ 7UXPS¶V victory speech) RI $PHULFD¶V
industrial working class. Whereas Obama carried places such as Wyoming River Valley in 
northeastern Pennsylvania and Youngstown in 2KLR &OLQWRQ¶V QHJOHFW RI WKH 'HPRFUDWV¶
working-class base came back to haunt her as the industrial ghost-towns across Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Iowa went with Trump. It was not simply white men but also a majority of 
white women ± those without college degrees ± as well as about 30 per cent of Latinos and 
around 8 per cent of African-American voters who together with the Republican core support 
HQVXUHG7UXPS¶VWULXPSK 
 
The reservoir of resentment that the Trump movement has tapped into is closely correlated 
with the contempt in which the leadership of the Democratic Party holds working-class 
people. In the former heartlands along the Rust Belt and in the south, Clinton and her clique 
on the Democratic National Committee are viewed as arrogant, snobbish, uncaring about 
µRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶ DQGPRVWO\ serving the interests of their friends at Google and Goldman. 
There was a palpable sense that the Clinton campaign did not care about the SDUW\¶V
traditional base it took for granted. Her ideology betrayed the very people it purported to 
UHSUHVHQW &OLQWRQ¶V OLEHUDOLVP RI WKH µSURIHVVLRQDO FODVV¶ LV HPSW\ DQG WKLV YRLG is now 
occupied by Trump¶VLQVXUJHQF\. 
 
The seeds were sown in the late 1960s when the Democrats first embraced a progressive 
politics defined essentially by social liberalism and they abandoned the idea of creating an 
industrial democracy by fighting cartel capitalism. Fast forward to the early 1990s when Bill 
&OLQWRQ¶V µQHZ FHQWHU¶ aligned the party with liberal market globalization in which 
transnaWLRQDO WLHV SURJUHVVLYHO\ UHSODFH QDWLRQDO ERQGV 5REHUW 5HLFK &OLQWRQ¶V 6HFUHWDU\ RI
Labor, described this new model of political economy LQWKHIROORZLQJWHUPV³There will be no 
national products or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will 
QRORQJHUEHQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLHV$WOHDVWDVZHKDYHFRPHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWFRQFHSW´1 Thus 
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 Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-century Capitalism (New York: Vintage 
1992), p. 3 (original italics). 
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WKH &OLQWRQV¶ YHUVLRQ RI progressive politics rests on the idea of a capitalist culture that 
privileges mobility and permanent change over national sovereignty and more settled ways of 
life. From this perspective, patriotism, tradition, DQG SHRSOH¶V VHQVH RI belonging are 
subordinated to cosmopolitanism, modernization, and abstraction from embeddedness. To 
dismiss even half of Trump supporters DVµDEDVNHWRIGHSORUDEOHV¶VSHDNVYROXPHVDERXWWKH
arrogance of leading Democrats and their disdain for working families. Plenty of 
condescension and little empathy fuel the flames of rage that are engulfing America. 
 
Benefitting from the post-Cold War peace dividend, Bill Clinton not only balanced the federal 
budget but also adopted a new economic model based on job-exporting trade deals and the 
deregulation of Wall Street. When the 2008 financial crash hit, both the working and the 
middle classes struggled to make ends meet as their jobs were threatened and communities 
drowned in debt, but the Democrat establishment failed to understand their pain. 2EDPD¶V 
stimulus package helped to save the car industry but equally it bailed out the banks without 
demanding structural reform, leaving in place a system dominated by both big business and 
big government. Another example of this complicit collusion is Obamacare, which on the one 
hand has extended health care coverage to many millions of previously uninsured people, yet 
on the other hand represents a government subsidy of vast health care corporations. A 
mutualized model with many more health care cooperatives linked to community hospitals 
and a more personal care system is the radical alternative to a nationalized or privatized 
model (or the worst of both worlds) that was never seriously considered. None of this justifies 
7UXPS¶VSOHGJHWRUHSHDOparts of Obamacare, but it highlights yet another missed opportunity 
WRFKDOOHQJH$PHULFD¶VROLJDUFK\. 
 
Beyond the failure to build an economic settlement that works for its traditional working-class 
base (not just the old elites on Wall St and the new classes in Silicon Valley), the Democrats 
also lost popular trust because they engaged in identity politics. Starting in the late 1960s, the 
party began to embrace a utopian ideology of diversity that in reality adopted the values of 
students, middle-class feminists, ethnic minorities, as well as east and west coast college-
educated elites. 2  For all the important advancement in terms of equality and non-
discrimination, this liberal progressivism alienated more socially conservative voters who are 
predominantly white but also include many African-American and Latino communities (some 
of whom voted for Trump). Thus the Clinton and Obama presidencies tore down trade 
                                                        
2
 Mark Stricherz, :K\WKH'HPRFUDWVDUH%OXH+RZ6HFXODU/LEHUDOV+LMDFNHGWKH3HRSOH¶V3DUW\ (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2007). 
 3 
barriers and borders, building a global model of mobility that overwhelmingly enriched elites 
± HVSHFLDOO\DQHZµSURIHVVLRQDOFODVV¶ZKRDUHGULYHQLQHTXDOPHDVXUHE\µHQOLJKWHQHG¶VHOI-
interest and a sanctimonious pretense of moral superiority.3 But in the meantime the leading 
progressives in the Democratic Party ignored and even despised those who neither supported 
this politics nor benefitted from its effects ± those for whom free trade, open borders, and 
cosmopolitan multiculturalism meant greater economic hardship and unnerving cultural 
comprises. 
 
Compared with the emphasis on self-organization and mutual solidarity in the case of the civil 
rights movement, WKH 'HPRFUDWV¶ HPEUDFH RI GLYHUVLW\ DQG HPDQFLSDWLRQ has promoted an 
identity politics that is no less divisive than 7UXPS¶V DWDYLVWLF QDWLYLVP EHFDXVH LW LV D
µFRDOLWLRQ RI WKH IULQJHV¶ WKDW excludes the white working-class and sections of the middle 
class who resent identity politics for everyone else but them. Neither the Democrats nor the 
Republicans have a positive conception of place and belonging around which new coalitions 
FDQHPHUJHWKDWRYHUFRPHWKHROGLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVRIWKHµFXOWXUHZDUV¶ 
 
7UXPS¶Vvictory is only in part the result of DµZKLWH-ODVK¶DJDLQVWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWREVHVVLRQ
with certain minority rights and diversity at the expense of the majority. The other elements is 
the Latino, African-American, and even female vote that cannot be explained away by media 
bias or lack of education. What these different groups are most of all bitter about is liberal 
indifference or even hostility to a sense of belonging and the enduring importance of family, 
community, and locality. Trump drew support not simply from moral cave-dwellers (the 
xenophobes, racists and sexists who are much emboldened by his election) but much more 
significantly from working- and middle-class people who feel forgotten and resent their 
exclusion from Washington politics. 
 
What this reveals is not merely the deep divisions between the Democrats and their former 
supporters but the growing gulf between the people and the U.S. establishment, which Trump 
has used to his double advantage ± first smashing the Republican Party leadership before 
ZLQQLQJDQHOHFWLRQ WKDWZDV&OLQWRQ¶V to lose. Yet for all his posturing, Trump is a silver-
VSRRQGHPDJRJXHZKRUDLOVDJDLQVWWKHµULJJHGV\VWHP¶KHKDVSURILWHGIURPDQGWKHµRXW-of-
WRXFKHOLWH¶RIZKLFKKHLVDPHPEHU4 A self-made Manhattan billionaire with alleged links to 
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organized crime, Trump is neither a Middle American nor a Republican nor a classical 
conservative. Rather, his political outlook seems to combine nationalist-libertarian ideas with 
a preference for populist-authoritarian leadership at home and abroad. The red thread that runs 
through his rhetoric over the past thirty years is an anti-liberal assault on the implicit 
bipartisan consensus at the heart of U.S. politics: free trade, immigration and a liberal world 
RUGHU XQGHUZULWWHQ E\ $PHULFD¶V Hconomic and military might, as I have argued in these 
pages.5  
 
None of this is particularly new in U.S. politics. In 1992 Pat Buchanan ran for the Republican 
nomination promising a mix of mercantilism and greater geopolitical restraint. Half a century 
earlier, Senator Robert Taft who failed to become the Republican nominee in 1940, 1948 and 
1952 advocated isolationism before World War Two and thereafter opposed President 
7UXPDQ¶V SROLF\ WR H[SDQG WUDGH +LV DQWL-communism did not stop him from opposing 
containment and the creation NATO because it would over-FRPPLW $PHULFD 7UXPS¶V
penchant for Putin and other strongmen is also, as Thomas Wright has argued, ³reminiscent 
of Charles Lindbergh, once an American hero, who led the isolationist America First 
PRYHPHQW ,Q VRPH DUHDV 7UXPS¶V YLews go back even further, to 19th-century high-tariff 
protectionism and every-country-for-itself mercantilism´6 
 
What drives Trump is his anger about the bad deal the country supposedly gets from the 
liberal international order upheld by U.S. hegemony since 1945 and especially after 1989. 
Trump is opposed to the military alliances that are subsidized by American taxpayers, the 
trade arrangements that export jobs and import immigrants, as well as the promotion of liberal 
democracy that antagonizes IHOORZ µgreat powers¶ like 5XVVLD ZKLOH KDUPLQJ $PHULFD¶V
national self-interest. Anti-liberalism on economic, social, and geopolitical issues seems to be 
the common ground with Vladimir Putin. Both believe that their countries have not benefitted 
from the liberal model of globalization, which is why Trump wants to roll back free trade and 
immigration while Putin is trying to opt out in favor of parallel structures ± starting with 
greater protection from global forces for the national economies of neighboring countries that 
join the Eurasian Economic Union. The leaders of Russia and America are also united in 
rejecting WKHµRSHQ-ERUGHUSURJUHVVLYLVP¶RIOLEHUDOJRYHUQPHQWV across the West and want to 
put national greatness ahead of minority demands. And for different reasons, both favor neo-
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LVRODWLRQLVP IRU WKH 86$ EHFDXVH WKH\ VHH D ZHDULQHVV IURP WKH LPSHUDWLYH RI µJOREDO
OHDGHUVKLS¶± 7UXPSDWKRPHDQG3XWLQDFURVVWKHZRUOGH[FHSWDPRQJ$PHULFD¶V:HVWHUQ
allies who fear a resurgent Russia). 
 
By contrast, Trump who instinctively trusts nobody views Putin as a competitor, not an 
enemy or adversary. The new president is confident enough in his own strength and 
decisiveness and relies on an ability to speak with KLVFRXQWHUSDUWµPDQWRPDQ¶,QEXVLQHVV-
like fashion, Trump sees competition as µwin-win¶ so long as both sides are prepared to do a 
deal and cut their losses when an escalating conflict of interest threatens to spin out of control. 
The contours of such a deal are clear: in exchange for help on Islamic State, North Korea and 
Iran, Trump might recognize 5XVVLD¶Vpre-eminent status in a post-Assad Syria and grant her 
a greater role in global affairs. (But how to achieve this while trying to distance himself from 
Iran when Tehran and Moscow are allies and key pillars in the resistance against the Sunni 
fundamentalism that threatens much of the Middle East?) And in exchange for no further 
Russian military adventure in Eastern Europe where a refusal to retaliate would make Trump 
look weak (something he will not countenance), he might even accept the annexation of 
Crimea and a sphere of influence that includes Ukraine. What would be off the table is a 
policy of containment and demonization, alongside global trade arrangements excluding 
Russia, the continuation of economic sanctions, further NATO expansion, provocation on the 
Russian border, and the promotion of democracy across the entire post-Soviet space by way 
of US-orchestrated regime change. 
 
)DUIURPEHLQJDQRWKHUµreset¶ LQUHODWLRQVZLWK5XVVLDwhich under Obama failed due to a 
lack of strategic vision based on shared interests), Trump seems to propose a fundamental 
rapprochement. 7  While many politicians and pundits will dismiss it as an alliance of 
reactionaries (à la Lindbergh and Hitler) or a new Populist International that also includes 
%ULWDLQ¶V8.,3DQG)UDQFH¶V0DUWLQHLe Pen, the aim is seemingly WRJHW$PHULFD¶VDOOLHVLQ
Asia and Europe to pay their fair share for the U.S. security umbrella and to tone down the 
level of vitriol in order to avert an escalation with Moscow that might end in war. 
 
For all his bluster and apparent incompetence, Trump may be a ruthless strategist with 
diabolic cunning and DZLO\SORWWKDWFRXOG\HWRXWIODQN5XVVLD¶V.*%-dominated leadership: 
keeping the Kremlin guessing in a geopolitical chess contest in which a simpleton from 
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Queens beats the µsupreme godfather¶ at his own game of trying to end the U.S.-led 
international order while oozing strenJWKDQGµPDNLQJ$PHULFDJUHDWDJDLQ¶ 
 
The paradox is that the Republicans control both Congress and the White House at a time 
ZKHQ WKH\DUHPRUHGHHSO\VSOLW WKDQVLQFH WKH WLPHRI/LQGEHUJK7UXPS¶V LQVXUJHQF\KDV
overthrown the hegemony of both Republican realists and the neocons, but the party 
establishment that is so profoundly steeped in American supremacy and a U.S.-dominated 
international order may yet strike back and try to torpedo 7UXPS¶V renewal of old 
mercantilist, protectionist and isolationist tendencies, which have been dormant for long. Not 
to mention the entire American foreign, security and defence policy establishment, the federal 
bureaucracy and the deep state that will try to capture Trump or at least neutralize any 
adventurism in the global arena of agon. 
 
So although we will not know for some time what Trump might do as President, his victory 
will likely mark the demise of the post-1945 liberal order that has been in retreat since 9/11 
and the 2008 financial crash. What might replace it and what happens next LVDQ\RQH¶VJXHVV
Will it be more global anarchy and a slide into direct confrontation between the U.S.A. and 
China? Or else some new order based on non-liberal institutions and rules, perhaps akin to a 
nineteenth-FHQWXU\W\SHµJUHDWSRZHU¶FRQFHUWLQDQHZJXLVHZLWKDQLPSOLFLWUHFRJQLWLRQRI
spheres of influence? Either way, the tectonic plates have already shifted and the unfolding 
earthquake is only just beginning to engulf the West and the rest. 
